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Towards Trustworthy Spatial Messaging





Spatial messaging is a term that deﬁnes the virtual publication of data in physical places. Generally, anyone
in the neighborhood of such a publication point gets the message. Frameworks allowing the users to publish
freely spatial messages already exist. However, the experiences realized with volunteers showed that there
is only little interest in posting such notes. To our view, the main reason is that there are currently no
trust and security mechanisms that inform about the trustworthiness of the messages, thus preventing any
serious application. Filling this gap will promote the success of spatial messaging and the growing success
of localization and mobile techniques will provide a good support for this concept. This paper describes the
spatial messaging services that we are in the process to deploy with our new spatial messaging framework,
which includes trust and security mechanisms.
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1 Introduction
Spatial messaging, also called digital graﬃti, air graﬃti, or splash messaging, allows
a user to publish a geo-referenced note so that any other user that attends the same
place can get the message.
There are many reasons to believe that spatial messaging will become a wide
spread concept in a nearby future. Today, people use the connection capabilities of
their mobile phone mostly in one way, to download information. But in the same
way that people passed from television to Internet, the next generation of user will
probably become active and publish information. If we remember how fast the
computer power and the communication capabilities of these devices improve, and
the fact that there are today more modern mobile phones (with Internet connection)
than desktop computers in the world, we can easily paint a glorious future for mobile
technology. This assertion can be conﬁrmed by the growing interest for location
awareness. The success of Mobile Mappy [9], a service that allows you to download
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maps on your mobile phone as well as POIs (Points Of Interest) wherever you are,
is an indicator of this growing interest. And Mobile Mappy is not alone. There are
more and more applications or Internet services for mobile users that provide maps
and other information related to your current position.
Based on previous deployment of spatial messaging prototypes, we argue that
the trust and security aspects are the main barrier for wide user adoption of spatial
messaging prototypes. For example, an analysis of a GeoNotes [11] log made during
a real-use study shows that 6% of the messages were signed using someone else’s
identity. At the end of the 6-month deployment of E-Graﬃti [1], it came out that it
was possible to post notes about online websites rather than related to the positions
of the notes and that the users used it only 7.6 times in average. We believe that
there are scenarios where users would really participate if trust and security are
guaranteed. For example, when John was on holidays at Sunny Beach, he took
some pictures, added comment about his tourist experience and then deﬁned that
all the people in his address book marked as friends should have access to it, and
ﬁnally posted the whole at his current position. One year later a friend of John
that chose the same place for his holiday ﬁnds the pictures and can read John’s
notes; he learns among other things that the expensive restaurant so recommended
by the tourist guides actually is not worth it. Section 2 presents related spatial
messaging attempts that still miss to fulﬁll these trust and security requirements
detailed in Section 3. The end of the paper presents an overview of our spatial
messaging framework in Section 4, which includes trust and security, as well as
implementation and deployment details about identity management in Subsection
4.2, trust management in Subsection 4.3 and contextualized evidence format in
Subsection 4.4. Finally, we discuss future work and conclude.
2 Related work
The following projects focus on spatial messaging.
E-Graﬃti [1] is a spatial messaging application that allows a user to read and
post geo-localized notes. These notes can be either public or private, meaning that
only the set of people deﬁned by the author are able to read the note. E-Graﬃti has
been designed to study the social impacts on spatial messaging. 57 undergraduate
students were given a laptop with E-Graﬃti for a semester. All their activity has
been logged and studied. And the results are far from encouraging. At the end of
the semester, it came out that a user logged into the system only 7.6 times in average
(std dev: 12.6), and that actually most of the user stuck to initial test messages.
Another disappointment was that most of the posted notes were not related to their
position. For example, a number of people posted notes to advertise a website. The
system was designed so that the user could only get messages available at his current
position, but it was possible to post a new message at any place from anywhere.
Technically, the position of the user is determined by the wireless access point to
which the device is connected. The precision is therefore limited to the building in
which the user is.
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GeoNotes [11] has more functionalities than E-Graﬃti. While posting a note,
the user can choose how he is going to sign it (for privacy reason the user can write
any text he wants as a signature), decide whether people are allowed to comment it,
and decide whether anyone can remove this message. For the readers, the graphical
interface of the application provides some interesting functionalities like showing
all the neighboring messages or sort them according to diﬀerent criteria. Inspired
by the E-Graﬃti evaluation, GeoNotes discarded the remote authoring of tags as
well as the possibility to ”direct” notes to certain users. The main interest of the
GeoNotes authors seems to be the navigation problems in the virtual messages
space. How to ﬁnd a speciﬁc note? How to select only relevant messages? One
answer of these questions consists in giving to the readers the possibility of ranking
the notes. Each user maintains also a friends list, which can be used as a ﬁlter.
But the trust and security aspects have not been taken into account. It is easy
to usurp someone’s identity and post funny notes. An analysis of a GeoNotes log
made during a real-use study showed that 6% of the messages have been signed
using someone else’s identity.
ActiveCampus Explorer [7] goes a step further by displaying also where other
users are. Every user holds a PDA and its location is determined by comparing
the signal strength of diﬀerent wireless access points. Thus, the system knows the
position of all its users, and communicates this information to the all of them that
are close together. Like E-Graﬃti and GeoNotes, it is also possible to tag objects.
Socialight [13] allows a user to post some data to a speciﬁc place, intended
for himself, for his friends, or for everybody. Meta-data containing keywords and
geographical coordinates are attached to the posted data, in order to facilitate
searches. Tags are called Stickyshadows and can be viewed with some speciﬁc
mobiles phones (and equipped with a positioning system) via the Socialight Mobile
application, or by browsing the Socialight website. A nice feature they provide
consists in showing Stickyshadows on maps.
A POI (Point Of Interest) is a geo-referenced item that presents a particular
interest, like a restaurant, a fuel stations, or a car park. Written in standard
formats, POI lists can be used by most navigation systems. POIplaces [15] is a
website where people can share their own POIs. It seems that academic projects
like E-Graﬃti or GeoNotes didn’t reach a critical mass of users. We believe also
that the lack of success is related to the lack of interest... in publishing notes just for
publishing notes! Spatial messaging would probably have more chance to emerge
if we focus on speciﬁc communities, with real problems that could be solved by
this concept, rather than imposing the system to students without giving them any
good reason to use it. Another reason could also be that it is impossible, in some
systems, to post anonymous messages.
We see there that spatial messaging is clearly not a new concept. Nevertheless,
none of the described systems take the trust and security aspects into account. In
E-Graﬃti users reveal their real identity. In GeoNotes people may stay anonymous,
but we see that user then usurped others’ identities; it is therefore not possible to
trust a message.
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3 Requirements for trustworthy and secure spatial mes-
saging
In this section, we ﬁrst discuss the security requirements for spatial messaging then
the trust requirements.
3.1 Spatial messaging security requirements
In a secured spatial messaging system, a user can be sure that the message he is
reading is really written by the mentioned author, that nobody has modiﬁed the
content of the original message, and that all other available messages at this place
are available. More precisely, a secured spatial messaging system has to respect
the traditional security services, namely, conﬁdentiality, integrity, availability, and
non-repudiation.
These security services are well-known [2] and we do not discuss them further in
this paper. There are many implementations that already proved their eﬃciency.
Our aim is to focus on speciﬁc security services, the ones that are required for spatial
messaging personal privacy considered as a human need [10] or right [3] (in addition
to the traditional ones). What we would like is a system in which an author can be
identiﬁed, but at the same time we would like to prevent any link with his real-life
identity. If the person can obtain an unlimited number of pseudonyms, then the
system can be victim of a Sybil attack [4]. The user must also be able to change
its pseudonym. Again, this must be done in an anonymous manner and it must be
impossible to link a former pseudonym with the new one.
A secured spatial massaging system must therefore respect, in addition to the
traditional security services, the following ones related to privacy:
(i) A user has only one pseudonym at a time.
(ii) A user must be able to change his pseudonym.
(iii) It is impossible to link a pseudonym to a real-life identity.
(iv) It is impossible to link two pseudonyms of the same real-life identity (an old one with a new one).
(v) Each pseudonym is unique, it is impossible that two diﬀerent real-life identities share the same
pseudonym. This is even true during time; if a user changes its pseudonym, the old one is locked and
can never be used again.
In the scenarios depicted in the introduction, the author chooses who will be
able to read the posted message. We are not going to discuss if it is a good idea
to allow publications for a restricted audience, since anyway we cannot avoid it.
Indeed, an author can always encrypt the content of his message with a key K
and then encrypt K with the public keys of each addressee. The question is more
how we are going to handle this issue, or what tools a spatial messaging system
should provide for that. With no tools then encrypted messages will be visible for
everyone (even if the content itself cannot be understood), so everyone can see who
published this message and can add comments to it. With supplied tools the system
could hide the messages for unwanted addressees. Which solution is better? Do the
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facilities introduced by these tools compensate the fact that the users lose control
over the system? This is still an open question.
3.2 Spatial messaging trust requirements
The previous subsection discussed the security aspects of spatial messaging. A
reader can be sure that a given message is really posted by its signer and that the
content has not been modiﬁed since. But even if the reader can be sure about the
author’s identity, it is useless if they do not know each other. This section discusses
how to add trust information on spatial messages so that the reader can evaluate
the trustworthiness of a message.
Trust is a very complex concept. Even if it is part of everyday life, diﬀerent
people give diﬀerent deﬁnitions of what trust is. This observation is even strongly
accentuated when we try to explain how to build a trust relation between machines,
or between humans and machines.
Spatial messaging needs a speciﬁc trust model that is suﬃciently ﬂexible to be
adapted to diﬀerent situations. In addition, the model should work for a very large
community of users. For example, if we suppose that the community of users is
quite small and that a Web-Of-Trust trust model [14] will be suﬃcient. If Alice
trusts Bob at 0.8 (out of 1), and Bob trusts Charlie at 0.5, then Charlie’s rating (in
Alice’s eyes) will only count for 0.8 * 0.5 = 0.4. This does not mean that Alice’s
trust in Charlie is only 0.4. It is only the number by which Charlie’s rating will be
multiplied. This easy formula is suﬃcient to give more importance to close friends,
and of course also more importance to reputable ones. However this model does
not work for large communities. In this case we need to know the global reputation
of the author. We could of course provide two diﬀerent models, but what if the
community is middle-sized? Anyway this is not a good solution since we can also
have a big community that contains smaller ones, in which the people knows each
other. One may easily imagine that lots of unknown people will put such kind of
messages, but we are only interested in the ones that are posted by friends. Finally,
the trust model must also be able to inform about the trustworthiness of the message
itself, without taking care of the author’s reputation. Even a very reputable author
can make a mistake and publish wrong information. Or, even more likely, a message
signed by a reputable editor can contain outdated information. The diﬀerent types
of trust values (e.g., in users or in the spatial messages themselves) have to be
combined and more or less weight must be given to each diﬀerent values according
to the current situation.
4 Towards a trustworthy spatial messaging framework
In order fulﬁll the previous requirements for spatial messaging, we have worked on
a new framework, called GeoVTag, which supports trusted and secured spatial mes-
saging. In GeoVTag we call vTag (virtual tag) a spatial message. Our framework
is meant to be deployed with centralized servers. Each server manages vTags of a
speciﬁc topic and each of them is identiﬁed by a diﬀerent URL and works indepen-
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dently from the others. The rest of this section depicts the main building blocks of
the GeoVTag framework.
4.1 Overview of the framework
For now we consider the framework as a black box containing six main modules
(see Fig. 1). There are three database modules and three processing modules. The
ﬁrst database is a history database, containing previous messages of the users. For
example, this information is useful for computational trust, which is carried in the
module called the trust engine. The second database is a tag database, containing
all the information about the tags and their context, for example location at time of
archival. The third database is an ID database about the identities of the entities
involved in the system. The geo toolkit module contains tools to compute geo-
related information (distances, precision of positioning, contextual information...).
The ﬁnal module is a security tool box used to authenticate and protect communi-
cations.
Fig. 1. Framework overview
Previous work on computational trust engines [12] has shown that trust engines
need a clear identity management layer in order to protect the users’ privacy whilst
mitigating many diﬀerent types of identity/privacy-triggered attacks at the repu-
tation layer, the most famous attack being the Sybil attack. Although in Section
4.2 we only detail an identity management scheme strongly related to the blind sig-
nature algorithm [16], we aim at following the generic approach taken in [12] with
regard to identity management where diﬀerent authentication/recognition schemes
can be plugged depending on a trade-oﬀ between adaptability, security, usability and
privacy. If we make a parallel with the basic trust engine high-level view depicted
This identity management part corresponds to the Entity Recognition
(ER) module whose responsibility is to recognize the involved entities based on the
available authentication/recognition scheme.
If we continue the parallel, the evidence store will use information from the three
database of the GeoVTag framework. The decision-making component can be called
whenever a trusting decision has to be made and uses two sub-components:
(i) a trust module that can dynamically assess the trustworthiness of the requesting entity based on the
trust evidence stored in the evidence store;
(ii) a risk engine that can dynamically evaluate the risk involved in the interaction, again based on the
available evidence in the evidence store.
in Figure 2.
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Fig. 2. Trust engine high-level view
We detail the evidence that our current implementation uses in Section 4.3 and
how this evidence is formatted in Section 4.4.
4.2 Identity management implementation
Any user can obtain anonymously all the vTags in his neighborhood just by queering
the server. To become a member, and therefore be able to review vTags (add
comments to an existing vTag) or be able to create new vTags, a user has to register.
The registration process allows you to choose a pseudonym and returns a key pair
that will be used each time to reconnect to the server. The registration process
is done so that it is impossible, even for the server, to make a link between a
pseudonym and the corresponding real-life identity. The process guarantees also
that each pseudonym is unique, so that it can be used as a unique identiﬁer.
There are two main processes in our initial identity management approach: a
ﬁrst process to get a pseudonym and a second process to change a pseudonym.
4.2.1 Getting a pseudonym
The process must respect the following rules:
(i) Rule 1: A user must stay anonymous from other users and from the server.
(ii) Rule 2: A user can have only one pseudonym at a time.
The ﬁrst rule explains by itself why we need pseudonyms. It is simply the only
way to stay anonymous (there is no way to link a message to a real-life identity)
and still have a way to be uniquely identiﬁed. The second rule avoids a Sybil attack
[4], where a user would create many diﬀerent virtual identities in order to subvert
the system. To get a pseudonym, a user must own a digital certiﬁcate, like the ones
supplied by Verisign or by some country ID cards (for example Belgium). We use
the blind signature algorithm [16], which allows a signer, e.g., the server, to digitally
sign information without seeing it (we do not detail how we use this algorithm due
to space limitation).
4.2.2 Changing a pseudonym
A member must be able to change its pseudonym. First for privacy reasons, if a
member thinks that his pseudonym can be linked with his real-life identity, he will
want to change it, and second to respect the rule that says that each pseudonym
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has to be unique. If two members choose the same pseudonym at the same time,
one of them must be able to change it. And remember, the members certiﬁcates
are blindly signed, so it is impossible for the server to avoid to sign twice the same
pseudonym. The server discovers a new pseudonym only the ﬁrst time that the
corresponding member reviews a vTag or creates a new one. Publishing a list of all
the existing pseudonyms is not a solution either, since the laps of time between the
creation of a new certiﬁcate and its ﬁrst utilization can be arbitrarily long. Note
that the fact that the server signs two certiﬁcates with the same pseudonyms is not
really a security problem, since each pseudonym is linked to a public key, and that
during a connection initialization the user will have to prove that he is the owner of
the corresponding private key. The process of changing a pseudonym must respect
the following rules:
(i) Rule 1: A user must stay anonymous from other users and from the server.
(ii) Rule 2: It is impossible to link a new pseudonym with a former one.
The ﬁrst rule is the same as for getting a pseudonym for the ﬁrst time. We insist
here that changing its pseudonym must in no way aﬀect the privacy of the seeker.
We propose the following algorithm, which respects the previous rules, for a user to
change it pseudonym:
(i) Alice connects to the server and identiﬁes herself with her member certiﬁcate.
(ii) The server challenges Alice to verify that she is really the owner of the old pseudonym. The challenge
is done by a Zero Knowledge Proof (ZKP) algorithm. We use the ZKP algorithm of Fiat and Shamir
[5]: it allows allows a prover (the entity that wants to prove something, e.g., Alice) to prove to a veriﬁer
(the entity that challenges the prover) that he owns a secret key, without giving any information about
the key itself. If the challenge is OK, Alice chooses a new pseudonym, creates a pair of asymmetric
keys, and makes a member certiﬁcate with the pseudonym and the public key.
(iii) Alice sends her new member certiﬁcate hidden in an envelope.
(iv) The server signs the envelope and sends it back to Alice.
(v) Alice opens the envelope and gets its new member certiﬁcate, signed by the server.
(vi) Alice waits a while before using the system to avoid that the server links the new pseudonym that
will appear on vTags to the former pseudonym.
4.3 Trust management implementation
This part discusses how we manage the trust information. In Subsection 3.2, we
introduced diﬀerent types of trust values. One concerned the reputation of the
message itself (without taking care of the author’s reputation), one about the local
reputation of the author (what a user and his friends think about him), one about
the global reputation of the author (what people in general think about him), and
ﬁnally one that combined the previous one according to the context and that can
be used to take decisions in an automatic way. These four values are included in
all the requested vTags, so that the reader can make himself an opinion about the
reliability of the message. We will now skim over how the server could compute
these values. Future work on this project will precisely heavily focus on this part.
M. Deriaz, J.-M. Seigneur / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 179 (2007) 123–133130
4.3.1 Tag reputation
This value indicates how reliable a vTag is, according only to the marks given
by the reviewers (we do not take into account the reputation of its author). A
simple solution consists in computing the average of all the reviewers’ marks. Other
solutions have to be studied, like giving more importance to reputable reviewers’
marks, or giving more importance to recent reviews.
4.3.2 Global reputation
The global reputation of an author is computed according to the marks of the
reviewers on all the vTags he authored. We could imagine that this value is simply
computed by doing an average on the marks, or even by giving more importance
to recent ratings, but we are not convinced that such an approach will work. First,
there is no motivation to rate other’s vTags. Second, a malevolent user could
systematically and automatically rate badly other’s vTags. Thus, the quality of
the rating itself must also be taken into account, and have an incidence on the
reputation of the reviewer. But how can we judge the quality of the review?
• Proposition 1: Compare to other reviewers and increase the reputation if the mark is similar (and decrease
if it is diﬀerent). Problem: A user can rate automatically all the vTags like the others in order to improve
its trust value.
• Proposition 2: Same than proposition 1, but compare the user’s rating only to marks that are done
afterward. Problem: It is better, but the attack remains the same: If a vTag owns good ratings, it is also
likely that the ensuing marks will be good.
• Proposition 3: Using pitfalls. Same than proposition 1, but the server sends time to time either good
vTags that are badly rated, or bad vTags that are good rated. If the user cheats by using an automatic
rating system, he will fall in such pitfalls. He becomes then suspect and will be observed more carefully.
For example the system could check if this user rates two vTags that are too distant from each other
to be reviewed within a given amount of time, or if this user tries to rate fake vTags that are posted in
inaccessible zones. If it becomes clear that a user is cheating, the server can simply revoke its pseudonym.
This is a big problem for the cheater since he won’t be able to get a new one without revealing is real-life
identity. Otherwise there is no other choice than to abandon deﬁnitively the system. Since it is quite
diﬃcult to isolate cheaters, it seems important to have a strong sanction against them. In this way we
diﬀer from many other reputation systems in which cheaters can usually simply change, in an anonymous
way, their pseudonym and start again with the same chances than any new user.
4.3.3 Local reputation
The local reputation is the reputation of the author in the eyes of the reader and
its friends. Each user holds a list of his friends as well as the trust value he grants
to each of them. This list is only modiﬁed on the user side but is stored on the
server. These lists are not available from the other users. The trust mechanism is
analogous to the PGP web of trust [14] for human entities. For example, if Alice
trusts Bob at 0.8 (out of 1), and Bob trusts Charlie at 0.5, then Charlie’s rating (in
Alice’s eyes) will only count for 0.8 * 0.5 = 0.4. This does not mean that Alice’s
trust in Charlie is only 0.4. It is only the number by which Charlie’s rating will be
multiplied. This easy formula is suﬃcient to give more importance to close friends,
and of course also more importance to reputable ones.
It is not conceivable to keep these friends list locally because they are used to
make friend of a friend relationships and because in this kind of application we can
easily imagine that the users are oﬄine most of the time.
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4.3.4 Server recommendation
This value is computed according to the previous ones, to the context, and to the
kind of service that is provided by this server.
4.4 Contextualizing and formatting evidence tags
This section presents how we contextualize and format tags in the GeoVTag frame-
work. A vTag is divided into three parts. The ﬁrst part is written by the server. It
contains trust information that can be read by the user in order to determine how
reliable this vTag is. The second part is the one written by the author of the vTag.
It contains geographical coordinates and the content of the vTag itself. The third
part is written by reviewers. Every member can indicates how much he agrees with
the content of the vTag and add information if needed.
We propose a standard way to represent vTags, based on XML. One reason
is to make the system interoperable. For example, we can imagine a tourist that
comes to our country. He sees on a ﬂyer the URL of a vTag server supplying useful
information in his mother tongue, like information about places he is visiting, or
what people with the same cultural background than him think about the diﬀerent
neighboring restaurants. If the potential user seems interested by this service, he
will probably accept to add the URL at his server list, but it is much more unlikely
that he accepts to add new software on his mobile phone for each new service. That
way we propose a standard way to represent vTags so that a single application can
display all the vTags around.






















<title>Danger – Dodgy District</title>
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5 Conclusion
This paper started by giving a global presentation of spatial messaging. In the
related work, we saw that this concept is currently far from widely accepted, and
that users are not very interested in publishing virtual messages attached to physical
places. We believe however that adding trust and security will completely change
the deal. As mentioned earlier, the problem with applications like E-Graﬃti or
GeoNotes is that they are not very useful if they are easily compromised. The
system and its messages must be trustworthy, even if the real-life identity of its
author is hidden.
We have implemented the ﬁrst version of the GeoVTag framework and we are
now focusing validation and evaluation. We have built a simulator that can be
used to deﬁne a large virtual community of users (including malevolent ones), ob-
serve how trust relationships are built, and make sure that a person who behaves
honestly receives in counterpart trustworthy information. However, our main val-
idation target is to successfully deploy our trust model speciﬁcally designed for
spatial messaging on a large-scale in real-life settings.
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